

Media references, visibility, and anti-media discourse: Brazilian mayoral candidates and the media in the 2024 elections

Referencias mediáticas, visibilidad y discursos antimediáticos: medios y políticos brasileños durante la campaña electoral

Referências na mídia, visibilidade e discursos antimídia: mídia e políticos brasileiros durante a campanha eleitoral
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32870/cys.v2025.9003>

MICHELE GOULART MASSUCHIN¹

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7918-4487>

RAQUEL MIRIAN PEREIRA DE SOUZA²

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1897-3631>

MAÍRA ORSO³

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1942-1377>

DANIEL KEI NAMISE⁴

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1173-5136>

RENATA COPATTI SALVADOR⁵

<https://orcid.org/0009-0001-7346-5517>

This study investigates how political actors engaged with and incorporated media references into their discourse during Brazil's 2024 mayoral elections. Drawing on a content analysis of 26 823 Instagram posts from 78 candidates, the findings reveal a predominance of positive references to the media, while anti-media rhetoric is more common among right-wing candidates. These findings contribute to ongoing discussions on the hybrid media system, underscoring the importance of local and regional outlets and reaffirming the central role of journalism in shaping political campaign narratives.

KEYWORDS: Media references, electoral campaigns, traditional and alternative media, Brazil, political communication.

El presente estudio analiza el modo en que los actores políticos incorporaron los medios de comunicación en sus discursos durante las elecciones brasileñas de 2024. A partir de un análisis de contenido de 26 823 publicaciones en Instagram, correspondientes a 78 candidaturas, se identificó un predominio de referencias positivas hacia los medios. En contraste, los discursos de carácter antimediático se manifestaron con mayor frecuencia entre candidaturas situadas en el espectro político de derecha. Los hallazgos aportan al debate sobre el sistema mediático híbrido, al subrayar la relevancia de los medios locales y regionales, así como la centralidad del periodismo en las narrativas de campaña. PALABRAS CLAVE: Referencias mediáticas, elecciones, medios tradicionales y alternativos, Brasil, comunicación política.

O presente estudo analisa como os atores políticos incorporam a mídia em seus discursos durante as eleições brasileiras de 2024. A partir da análise de 26.823 publicações no Instagram correspondentes a 78 candidaturas, identificou-se um predominio de referências positivas à mídia. Por outro lado, os discursos antimídia foram mais frequentes entre as candidaturas situadas no espectro político da direita. Esses resultados contribuem para o debate sobre o sistema midiático híbrido, destacando a importância da mídia local e regional, bem como a centralidade do jornalismo nas narrativas de campanha. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Referências midiáticas, eleições, meios tradicionais e alternativos, Brasil, comunicação política.

How to cite:

Goulart Massuchin, M., Pereira de Souza, R. M., Orso, O., Namise, D. K., & Copatti Salvador, R. (2025). Media references, visibility, and anti-media discourse: Brazilian mayoral candidates and the media in the 2024 elections. *Comunicación y Sociedad*, e9003. <https://doi.org/10.32870/cys.v2025.9003>

¹ Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil. mimassuchin@gmail.com

² Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil. raquelmirin99@gmail.com

³ Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil. maira.m.orso@gmail.com

⁴ Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil. daniel.namise@gmail.com

⁵ Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil. renatacopattisalvador@gmail.com

Submitted: 02/27/25. Accepted: 10/06/25. Published: 11/12/25.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines how political actors reference and appropriate the media in the context of Brazilian elections. Unlike traditional studies of political journalism, which typically focus on how the media cover candidates (Albuquerque, 2019; Marques et al., 2021; Porto et al., 2020), this study reverses the analytical lens: instead of looking at how the media portray politicians, it explores how politicians themselves engage with the media during their campaigns. In other contexts, previous research has identified various modes of interaction, including criticism and delegitimization of the traditional press, the strategic use of media to gain visibility, the search for content, and the promotion of specific issues (Buyens et al., 2024; Carratalá & Palau-Sampio, 2022; Engesser et al., 2017; Holt & Haller, 2017; Liminga & Strömbäck, 2023; Paatelainen et al., 2022; Peucker & Fisher, 2023; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2016). All these practices operate within a broader framework of strategic political action (Egelhofer et al., 2021).

To explore this phenomenon in the Brazilian context, this study analyzed 26 823 Instagram posts published during the electoral period, when 78 candidates were running for mayor in Brazil's state capitals. From this dataset, 3994 posts were identified as containing direct references to the media. These references took various forms –from the direct sharing of media content to mentions of media organizations, journalistic practices, or individual media professionals. Our analysis focused on five dimensions: 1) which media outlets were mentioned; 2) the presence of anti-media discourse; 3) the purposes behind such discourse; 4) instances of positive engagement with the media; and 5) patterns of media appropriation. These elements were examined in relation to both the candidates' profiles and their positions along the ideological spectrum.

The article advances four hypotheses. The first (H1) posits that positive engagement with the media is more prevalent than anti-media discourse, reflecting politicians' pursuit of visibility and their strategic use of content that serves their interests (Peucker & Fisher, 2023).

The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that incumbents are less likely to adopt anti-media rhetoric. Career politicians tend to view the press

as an important ally in shaping their public image, are more aware of institutional pressures (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013), and already benefit from the established logic of traditional media (Hopmann et al., 2011).

The third hypothesis (H3) holds that far-right candidates are more likely than others to produce anti-media discourse, a trend consistently supported by previous research showing a strong correlation between ideological extremism and media criticism (Egelhofer et al., 2021; Engesser et al., 2017; Holt & Haller, 2017).

Finally, the fourth hypothesis (H4) reinforces the association between far-right candidates and the use of alternative media, a pattern repeatedly observed in the literature (Santos, 2023; Wong & Trilling, 2023).

The context of our analysis are local municipal election campaigns in Brazil, which represents the political arenas most directly experienced by citizens and is characterized by a wide range of political behaviors. This environment allows candidates to engage with a variety of local and regional media outlets, a distinctive feature of the Brazilian media system (Albuquerque & Pinto, 2019). Instagram, in particular, has become a widely used source of information (Newman et al., 2024) and is commonly regarded both as an electoral campaign tool and as a research topic at the national (Costa et al., 2022) and international levels (García-Beaudoux et al., 2020; Haßler et al., 2024).

HOW POLITICIANS ENGAGE WITH TRADITIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE MEDIA

The growing reliance on digital platforms (Sued & Saézn-Leandro, 2025) and the dynamics of the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) have expanded the range of informational resources available to politicians (Palau-Sampio & Lopez-García, 2022). Consequently, alternative media have become just as significant a reference point as traditional outlets (Liminga & Strömbäck, 2023). Furthermore, local and regional media should not be overlooked, as they maintain distinct ties and relationships with politicians across Brazil (Albuquerque & Pinto, 2019; Guerrero, 2014).

Politicians seek visibility, legitimacy, and platforms to amplify their discourse, relying on the media to generate public impact and recognition (Bos et al., 2011). Historically, Brazil's media landscape has been dominated by a few major conglomerates with close ties to political actors (Albuquerque, 2011). However, the struggle for control over communication has reshaped these relationships, particularly with the rise and expansion of alternative media (Santos, 2023). For decades, the public relied on newspapers, television, and radio as their main sources of information, but this flow of communication has since become far more diversified.

As new forms of media have proliferated, traditional outlets have been forced to contend with new actors involved in producing and circulating content (Kenix, 2011). At the same time, the growing presence of political leaders in alternative online spaces has challenged the traditional monopoly over information (Engesser et al., 2017) and further weakened the central role of mainstream media in public debate (Wong & Trilling, 2023).

In Brazil, alternative media, once marginalized, first gained influence through progressive blogs in the early 2000s (Aldé et al., 2007; Magalhães et al., 2020), and later through far-right websites (Santos, 2023; Recuero & Soares, 2022) that often mimic traditional journalistic formats. These outlets also produce opinion content and have been accused of spreading disinformation across multiple platforms (Bauer et al., 2025; Bos et al., 2011; Egelhofer et al., 2021; Peacock et al., 2021; Wong & Trilling, 2023).

Although traditionally associated with the marginalization of minority voices, far-right alternative media have expanded rapidly across various contexts (Bhat & Chadha, 2020; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019), with their content frequently amplified by politicians (Liminga & Strömbäck, 2023; Wong & Trilling, 2023) and often described as hyperpartisan (Peacock et al., 2021; Recuero & Soares, 2022). In Brazil, this type of media gained particular prominence during the Covid-19 pandemic, under the Bolsonaro administration, and during electoral periods (Recuero & Soares, 2022; Santos, 2023).

In the case of Latin American politicians, relationships with the media—whether traditional or alternative—are largely driven by the desire to

control ideological narratives (Albuquerque, 2019). Many politicians favor channels with fewer bureaucratic barriers that operate according to a counter-hegemonic logic relative to traditional media, aiming to undermine their credibility (Kenix, 2011; Liminga & Strömbäck, 2023). While these actors criticize the mediatization of politics promoted by large media conglomerates, they have paradoxically become a dominant force in deploying alternative media strategies (Santos, 2023). These strategies include using podcasts, sharing links to social media posts, and promoting headlines from hyperpartisan outlets (Larsson, 2019; Recuero & Soares, 2022).

POLITICIANS' USE OF MEDIA: POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT AND CRITICISM

For politicians, engagement with the media serves two main purposes: building visibility and legitimacy (Landerer, 2013), particularly during election campaigns (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014), and voicing criticism of perceived bias, disinformation, or distortion of facts (Egelhofer et al., 2021; Engesser et al., 2017). Politicians often alternate between using the media constructively to promote their agendas (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014) and employing anti-media rhetoric to delegitimize unfavorable coverage (Bennett & Livingston, 2020), a pattern that has been observed among members of Congress in Brazil (Comel, 2025). This dynamic demonstrates both the media's strategic importance in electoral competition (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2008) as well as the role of media criticism in reshaping power relations (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999).

According to Van Aelst and Walgrave (2016), politicians rely on the media as a fundamental tool to advance their agendas and legitimize their actions. This is especially important during election periods, when media coverage amplifies their proposals and increases their visibility in the public sphere (Salgado, 2022). Incumbents, in particular, tend to use the media strategically to bolster their institutional legitimacy (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2016). Hopmann et al. (2011) note that politicians leverage media coverage to showcase their achievements and enhance their credibility with voters, ensuring a steady flow of information favorable to their public image (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013;

Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2016). Positive media use is also linked to shaping narratives and influencing the public agenda (Strömbäck & Kioussis, 2019), allowing political actors to emphasize issues that advance their agendas while tailoring their messages to resonate with public interests (Buyens et al., 2024).

On the other hand, scholars have also drawn attention to the growing trend of attacking or discrediting the media, particularly among populist and right-wing groups (Egelhofer et al., 2021; Holt & Haller, 2017; Marques, 2023; Massuchin et al., 2022; Waisbord & Amado, 2017). Engesser et al. (2017) note that these actors use such attacks to delegitimize the traditional press and strengthen their ties with their electoral base. In doing so, politicians portray themselves as “victims” of a hostile and biased media system (Strömbäck & Kioussis, 2019), while also directing their criticism toward international outlets or national media conglomerates, commonly referred to as “mainstream” or hegemonic media (Waisbord & Amado, 2017).

Attacking the media also serves as a strategic tool in times of crisis or political instability. Strömbäck and Kioussis (2019) argue that by undermining the credibility of the press, politicians seek to deflect attention from scandals or controversies and redirect public focus toward the media’s alleged bias. This pattern aligns with the Latin American context, where far-right leaders often employ attacks on the media as part of a broader populist mobilization strategy (Salgado, 2022; Waisbord & Amado, 2017).

Such attacks are most often directed at traditional media outlets (Figuenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019). This, in turn, reinforces the legitimacy of alternative media, which frequently act as amplifiers of these narratives (Waisbord, 2018). As Roberts and Wahl-Jorgensen (2020) note, challenging the credibility of the press helps strengthen the influence of emerging actors in the public sphere. In this context, politicians use media attacks to reshape the communication landscape and extend their control over dominant narratives (Bhat & Chadha, 2020), particularly those advanced by hyperpartisan outlets.

THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT: POLITICAL, ELECTORAL, AND MEDIA SYSTEMS

Brazil's political system has several distinctive institutional features that set it apart from most industrialized democracies, particularly through its adoption of hybrid forms of political representation (Mainwaring et al., 1991). Executive power—vested in presidents, governors, and mayors—is concentrated in officials elected by universal suffrage, typically through a two-round system with the possibility of one consecutive re-election. By contrast, the legislative branch—comprising the National Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate), state assemblies, and municipal councils—operates under an open-list proportional representation system in a single round of voting. Another defining characteristic is the prominent role of the judiciary, which is responsible for organizing and regulating electoral processes, placing Brazil among the few democracies with such an institutional configuration (Camara et al., 2022).

This institutional framework has given rise to specific political dynamics. As Mauerberg et al. (2015) observe, the open-list proportional voting system, the possibility of immediate re-election, the large number of candidates competing for relatively few seats, and the freedom to change parties with minimal penalties have all contributed to political individualism and weakened party cohesion. Brazil's multiparty system reinforces this trend, with 29 registered parties currently recognized (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2024). The proliferation of party labels has diluted ideological platforms and encouraged the formation of coalitions often disconnected from coherent policy agendas (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2016). Consequently, the Brazilian political system is marked by strong personalism and low levels of party institutionalization (Carreirão, 2014).

In this context, applying Hallin and Mancini's (2004) concept of *political parallelism* to the alignment between media organizations and political orientations in Brazil proves challenging. As Albuquerque (2011) states, Brazil's major traditional media conglomerates, such as *Globo*, *Folha*, and *Abri*, do not maintain explicit affiliations with

specific parties or candidates.⁶ Nevertheless, these conglomerates exert considerable influence over both public and private institutions and play a central role in shaping the public agenda (Pimentel & Marques, 2021). More commonly, they exhibit pragmatic alignments with candidates and governments whose political and economic interests converge with their own, often manifested through increased media visibility or favorable editorial coverage (Porto et al., 2020).

Brazil's media landscape has also undergone a process of demassification, accompanied by the rise of digital-native outlets. As Santos and Albuquerque (2024) observe, these digital media organizations often align with particular ideological camps shaped by ongoing political disputes. This trend reflects how party fragmentation and political instability have impeded the development of stable, long-term alignments between political groups and the media.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Our empirical research is based on an analysis of the Instagram accounts of 78 candidates⁷ who ran for mayor in Brazil's 2024 local elections. In total, we collected 26 823 posts published during the campaign period, from August 16 to October 27, encompassing both the first and second rounds.⁸ We extracted the data using the Zeeschuimer software, from a database managed by the Political Communication and Public Opinion Research Group (CPOP).

⁶ According to Guerrero (2014), the relationship between politicians and the media becomes increasingly complex when we consider local broadcasters affiliated with major television networks. As Pimentel and Marques (2021) note, these networks –often controlled by local elites– are frequently leveraged to advance particular interests, reinforcing regional power dynamics.

⁷ The sample corpus includes 78 candidates from the 26 Brazilian state capitals. In each state, we selected the most competitive candidates based on regional opinion polls and by including those who ranked first, second, or third in the number of valid votes, according to the official results from the Superior Electoral Court.

⁸ In Brazil, municipalities with more than 200 000 registered voters hold a runoff election if no candidate secures more than 50% of the valid votes.

We constructed the media-related corpus in two stages. First, we searched the 26 823 posts using keywords⁹ to identify content that referred to 1) journalism, 2) media professionals, and 3) traditional or hyperpartisan outlets (Egelhofer et al., 2021; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019). Second, we manually examined the visual content to determine whether the images posted on Instagram reflected the candidates' interactions with the media.

The final selection yielded a sample of 3 994 posts, which were systematically coded using a codebook (Krippendorff, 2004), which was developed drawing on existing literature (Cushion et al., 2021; Egelhofer et al., 2021; Haller & Holt, 2019) and an initial, unsystematic review of the corpus to capture the specific characteristics of the Brazilian context.

TABLE 1
VARIABLES AND CATEGORIES USED FOR DATA CODING

Media outlet (V1.1)	Descriptive variable used to record the name of the media outlet mentioned. If the outlet is not clearly specified (e.g., only a professional is mentioned or the reference is to the press in general) or if multiple outlets are mentioned, use code 99.
Type of media mentioned (V1.1)	1: Traditional; 2: Digital native and hyperpartisan; 3: Professionals; 4: Public media; 5: International media; 6: Media in general

⁹ Antagonista; Band; BandNews; BBC; Bonner; Brasil 247; Campos Melo; CBN; CNN; Conexão Política; DataFalha; DCM; entrevista; Estadão; fake-news; Folha; Folha Política; FSP; G1; Gazeta Brasil; Gazeta do Povo; Globo; imprensa; IstoÉ; jornal; Jornal da Cidade; Jornal Nacional; jornalismo; jornalista; Jovem Pan; matéria; mídia; Mídia Ninja; news; notícia; Novae-ramídia; OESP; Pingos nos Is; Pleno News; radardamídia; rádio; Record; RedeTV; renovamídia; reportagem; repórter; revista; revista fórum; Revista Oeste; Roda Viva; SBT; televisão; TerçaLivretv; Terra; Terra Brasil; Trombeta News; TV; TV Brasil; UOL; Veja; Vera Magalhães; VlogdoLisboa, and Yahoo.

Anti-media discourse? (V2)	0: No; 1: Yes
Purpose of criticism or attack (V3)	1: Criticize the media group; 2: Criticize media professionals; 3: Criticize coverage; 4: General criticism of the media; 99: Not applicable
Positive discourse? (V4)	0: No; 1: Yes
Purpose of positive media use (V5)	1: Attack opponents or political institutions; 2: Reinforce information and opinions; 3: Gain visibility; 99: Not applicable

Source: The authors.

Five trained coders carried out the coding and performed a reliability test, which produced Krippendorff's alpha scores of 0.67 (V1), 0.98 (V2), 0.73 (V3), 0.65 (V4), and 0.71 (V5). These variables were then analyzed according to candidate type (incumbent, government-backed, or challenger) and ideological orientation to assess how media engagement factored into broader campaign strategies.

To classify parties along the ideological spectrum, this study employed the scale developed by Bolognesi et al. (2023). For analytical clarity, however, the categories were consolidated into three broader groups: left (far-left and left), center (center-left, center, and center-right), and right (right and far-right).

DATA ANALYSIS

Media outlets were referenced in 15% of the posts published by the 78 candidates during the 2024 electoral campaign. When examining mentions by ideological orientation and candidate type (Table 2), right-wing politicians and challengers accounted for the highest shares of mentions (16% and 15%, respectively). However, these differences were not statistically significant across groups.

The subset of posts referencing media outlets ($n = 3\,994$) reflects a mix of traditional and digital-native media, highlighting the diversity of the contemporary media landscape. Figure 1 presents the 23 most frequently cited outlets by candidates (those mentioned more than 30 times), which together account for 1 735 posts, representing 43% of


TABLE 2
MENTIONS BY IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM AND CANDIDATE TYPE

	Absence	Presence	Total
Left	5 622 (86%)	925 (14%)	6 547 (100%)
Center	2 241 (88%)	318 (12%)	2 559 (100%)
Right	14 966 (84%)	2 751 (16%)	17 717 (100%)
Total	22 829 (85%)	3 994 (15%)	26 823 (100%)
Challenger	15 986 (85%)	2 904 (15%)	18 890 (100%)
Government-backed	1 913 (86%)	323 (14%)	2 236 (100%)
Incumbent	4 930 (87%)	767 (13%)	5 697 (100%)
Total	22 829 (85%)	3 994 (15%)	26 823 (100%)

Source: The authors.

the corpus. *Globo* (302), *Band* (175), *TV Record* (169), and *Jovem Pan* (115) rank highest, underscoring the continued centrality of traditional media, although some citations refer to their digital platforms, such as G1 from the Globo Group.

FIGURE 1
MEDIA OUTLETS MOST FREQUENTLY CITED BY CANDIDATES



Source: The authors.

Local and regional media are also noteworthy, including *TV Sergipe* (72 mentions), *TV Atalaia* (41), and *RPC* (38), all affiliates of national networks. This finding underscores the significant role these outlets play in political campaigns. *Jovem Pan* is another prominent example, having emerged in recent years as a central actor in political debates. Among digital-native outlets, *Podcast Flow* and *Metrópoles* illustrate the diversity of the Brazilian media landscape. Additionally, *TV Cultura* ranks among the most cited, which may reflect recognition of the value of content produced by the public media system.

When comparing mentions by media type (Table 3), traditional outlets account for 73% of all references, with a fairly even distribution across ideological groups. This indicates that conventional media have not been entirely displaced, at least within the broader context of Brazilian politics and the electoral period. Generic or collective references to the media—which in some cases still include traditional outlets—constitute 12% of mentions, with little variation between groups.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDIA TYPES BY IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM

		Left	Center	Right	Total
Traditional	N	719	248	1 963	2 930
	(%)	(78%)	(78%)	(71%)	(73%)
Digital-native and hyper-partisan	N	73	17	403	493
	(%)	(8%)	(5%)	(15%)	(12%)
Journalists/professionals	N	7	6	7	20
	(%)	(1%)	(2%)	(0%)	(1%)
Public media	N	8	1	79	88
	(%)	(1%)	(0%)	(3%)	(2%)
International media	N	0	1	2	3
	(%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)
Media in general	N	118	45	297	460
	(%)	(12%)	(15%)	(11%)	(12%)
Total		925	318	2 751	3 994
	(%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)

Source: The authors.

Up to this point there has been little distinction between the groups. However, when examining mentions of digital-native outlets –including hyper-partisan media– a clear difference emerges. Right-wing candidates refer to this category more frequently (15% of their mentions), suggesting that this group tends to rely more consistently on ideologically aligned sources.

When comparing candidate types (Table 4), traditional media are widely cited across all profiles, indicating broad recognition of these outlets in the electoral debate. However, government-backed candidates stand out, with 86% of their mentions referring to traditional media, whereas challengers more frequently reference “the media in general” (13%). Finally, no substantial differences appear among candidate groups in their mentions of digital-native or hyperpartisan media.


TABLE 4
MEDIA MENTIONS BY CANDIDATE TYPE

		Chal- lenger	Govern- ment-backed	Incumbent	Total
Traditional	N	2 097	277	556	2 930
	(%)	(72%)	(86%)	(72%)	(73%)
Digital-native and hyper-partisan	N	358	30	105	493
	(%)	(12%)	(9%)	(14%)	(12%)
Journalists/ professionals	N	17	1	2	20
	(%)	(1%)	(0%)	(0%)	(1%)
Public media	N	56	1	31	88
	(%)	(2%)	(0%)	(4%)	(2%)
International media	N	2	0	1	3
	(%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)
Media in general	N	374	14	72	460
	(%)	(13%)	(5%)	(9%)	(12%)
Total (%)		2 904	323	767	3 994
		(100%)	(100%)	(100%)	(100%)

Source: The authors.

Figures 2 and 3 below present mentions –both positive and negative¹⁰ grouped by candidate type and ideological orientation. The first notable finding is that, despite the increase in attacks on the press, most references remain positive. In other words, candidates continue to cite media content because it retains strategic value and delivers measurable benefits. Right-wing candidates exhibit the highest proportion of positive mentions (95%), followed by left-wing candidates (93%) and centrist candidates (88%).

Conversely, although negative mentions remain rare, they are more prevalent among right-wing candidates, reflecting the anti-media rhetoric associated with this group. While infrequent overall, these negative mentions reveal a clear ideological disparity: left- and center-wing candidates account for only 1% of negative mentions, compared with 5% among right-wing candidates.



Source: The authors.


¹⁰ Positive and negative mentions are treated as separate dichotomous variables (presence versus absence). As a result, the percentages in the graphs should not be summed, since they may not add up to 100%. In some cases (138), a media mention is neither positive nor negative –these are references that neither criticize the media nor provide any clear benefit to the candidate. In other instances, some posts (27) contained both positive and negative mentions simultaneously.

Looking at candidate type (Figure 3), government-backed candidates account for all positive media mentions (100%), followed by incumbents (98%) and challengers (92%). Negative mentions are more frequent among new candidates (5%), suggesting that they tend to have a more contentious relationship with the press. Across the entire corpus, there were 136 negative mentions—just over 3% of posts containing any reference to the media—and 93% of these (125) were concentrated among new and right-wing candidates. Nearly half of the criticisms (45%) were directed at media professionals, indicating a personalized discourse targeting journalists and other media personnel.

In the case of positive discourse, different purposes emerge when considering either the ideological orientation or candidate type. Across ideological groups (Figure 4), the primary function of positive mentions is to reinforce information and opinions, serving as a source of validation for the candidates' own political messages. The proportions are similar across the spectrum: left-wing (47%), center (49%), and right-wing (47%).

Second, across all three groups, candidates use the media to increase their visibility, promoting their presence through interviews, debates, and other coverage. Another notable use is to attack opponents and institutions, a common strategy among right-wing (27%) and left-wing (25%) candidates but less frequent among centrists (21%). In this respect, the strategies of the two ideological poles are quite similar. While negative campaigning is not a novel phenomenon, in this context it is closely tied to media content and carried out through media channels.

Examining the purposes of positive mentions across candidate types, challengers use them more frequently to attack opponents (27%) and increase visibility (30%), reflecting their greater reliance on negative campaigning and media exposure. In contrast, incumbents and government-backed candidates primarily use positive mentions to reinforce opinions and information (58% and 53%), reflecting a more institutionalized relationship with the press, which provides ongoing coverage of their previous administrations.



Source: The authors.

TABLE 5
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE MEDIA MENTIONS BY MEDIA TYPE

	Negative use			Positive use		
	Traditional	Digital	Total	Traditional	Digital	Total
Absence	2 883 (98%)	477 (97%)	3 360 (98%)	125 (4%)	15 (3%)	140 (4%)
Presence	47 (2%)	16 (3%)	63 (2%)	2 805 (96%)	478 (97%)	3 283 (96%)
Total	2 930 (100%)	493 (100%)	3 423 (100%)	2 930 (100%)	493 (100%)	3 423 (100%)

Source: The authors.

Finally, the distribution of positive and negative mentions across media types –traditional and digital-native– reveals no clear pattern in candidates’ engagement. Positive mentions are not predominantly directed at digital-native media, nor are negative mentions primarily aimed at traditional outlets.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

During the 2024 municipal elections, references to the media –whether traditional, alternative, or general– were largely positive, supporting the findings of Egelhofer et al. (2021) and confirming our first hypothesis (H1). The scarce use of anti-media rhetoric in this electoral campaign period contrasts with previous findings on this type of discourse in other contexts and among different political actors (Marques, 2023; Massuchin et al., 2022). Moreover, the prominence of regional media in these local elections alters the relationship between politicians and the press, reinforcing Albuquerque and Pinto’s (2019) observations regarding the dynamics of the Brazilian media landscape.

Even amid the fragmentation of the media landscape and the growing prominence of alternative outlets documented by Santos (2023) and Recuero and Soares (2022), traditional media continue to play a central role. Candidates frequently engage with both national networks and their local affiliates, underscoring the significance of regional outlets. Moreover, by leveraging these media, candidates pursue strategies aimed at local constituents, reflecting the dynamics of municipal-level competition.

These findings also align with the argument that politicians use the media to enhance their visibility during election periods (Costa et al., 2022; Larsson, 2019). Positive media use is widespread, with a key purpose being to showcase the candidates’ mediated public image in digital campaigns. Economic factors may also influence this dynamic. As noted in several Brazilian campaign manuals, economic considerations play a decisive role in campaign planning (Almeida, 2008; Ferraz, 2008; Iten & Kobayashi, 2002). In this context, the use of short videoclips can serve as a cost-effective strategy to reinforce positions or attack opponents by selectively editing debates, interviews, or previously recorded events. The use of media to target adversaries –a tactic employed by both right- and left-wing candidates– is also a significant component of negative campaigning, which has played an increasingly central role in Brazilian elections in recent decades (Borba, 2015).

Simultaneously, by incorporating videoclips from news programs, candidates capitalize on the symbolic authority of journalism, drawing

on established conventions –such as the language and visual style of television news– to lend greater credibility to their narratives (Oliveira, 2005).

In the case of anti-media discourse, we find it primarily associated with challenger candidates rather than incumbents, confirming the second hypothesis (H2). As Bennett and Livingston (2020) point out, the behavior of political actors can vary depending on their background. In this case, the data indicate that a candidate's relationship with the media as a political strategy is shaped by a neo-institutionalist perspective (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013). Sitting officeholders, for instance, tend to adopt a more moderate approach, influenced by the public scrutiny they face and the visibility their administrations receive through the press (Egelhofer et al., 2021).

The association between right-wing candidates and anti-media discourse supports our third hypothesis (H3). Although negative mentions of the media are relatively rare (5%), they are largely concentrated among right-wing leaders, consistent with existing research (Holt & Haller, 2017; Salgado, 2022), even though these actors also display the highest levels of positive media use. These negative references are primarily directed at journalism professionals, who are often portrayed as biased and partisan within the political arena, as highlighted by Bhat and Chadha (2020), Waisbord and Amado (2017), and Marques (2023).

It is also noteworthy that right-wing politicians, while relying more heavily on traditional media than other political groups, are also the most frequent users of digital-native and hyperpartisan outlets. These findings support our fourth hypothesis (H4) and align with research by Hopmann et al. (2011) and Bhat and Chadha (2020), which shows that far-right actors often turn to less conventional media to enhance their visibility. Egelhofer et al. (2021) similarly emphasize that populist leaders tend to make greater use of alternative media. However, in the Brazilian context examined here, positive engagement cannot be directly attributed to alternative media use or to attacks on traditional outlets.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article examines the digital campaign strategies of candidates in Brazil's 2024 municipal elections, with a particular focus on their use of media in political communication. While some findings align with existing literature, others reveal distinctive and complex dynamics within Brazil's media landscape. Overall, the results underscore the central role of media for all political groups and candidates, particularly through positive engagement with traditional outlets.

Despite the growth of alternative and hyperpartisan media, traditional journalism continues to occupy a central role in political campaigns, particularly content produced by local and regional outlets, which are deeply embedded in the context of mayoral contests. This dynamic diminishes the prominence of attacks on the traditional press, which remain relatively rare in the local electoral context. Overall, media use is particularly prominent in the construction of negative campaigns targeting opponents, consolidating candidates' public image and highlighting the initiatives or achievements of those seeking re-election (Egelhofer et al., 2021).

In conclusion, positive engagement with the media and media criticism are not mutually exclusive in politicians' strategies; rather, they often function together as complementary tools. This reflects a complex, convenience-driven relationship in which favorable media use is closely intertwined with anti-media rhetoric. Similar patterns have been observed in other political contexts and countries (Comel, 2025; Egelhofer et al., 2021; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2016). Moreover, in regional settings and within the diverse media landscape of electoral campaigns, critical discourse tends to lose much of its impact. This seemingly paradoxical duality allows politicians to maximize control over the public narrative, simultaneously leveraging favorable media coverage while discrediting sources that might threaten their popularity. Such a hybrid approach proves particularly effective in digital environments, where both positive and critical messages can spread widely.

FUNDING

This article is part of the project “Appropriations of Journalism by the Political Sphere in Brazil and Spain: The Circulation of Content from Alternative and Traditional Media in a Comparative Perspective Based on Parliamentary Communication”, funded by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq; Grant No. 201050/2024-2) under MCTI/CNPq Call No. 14/2023. It also forms part of the research conducted at the National Institute of Science and Technology on Disputes and Informational Sovereignities (INCT-DSI; Grant No. 406504/2022-9).

Bibliographic references

- Albuquerque, A. (2011). On models and margins. In D. C. Hallin & P. Mancini (Eds.), *Comparing media systems beyond the Western world* (pp. 72-95). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139005098.006>
- Albuquerque, A. (2019). Protecting democracy or conspiring against it? Media and politics in Latin America: A glimpse from Brazil. *Journalism*, 20(7), 906-923. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917738376>
- Albuquerque, A., & Pinto, P. A. (2019). O sistema midiático brasileiro no contexto da América Latina. In R. Figueiras & N. Ribeiro (Coords.), *O setor dos media no espaço lusófono* (pp. 101-124). Editora Universidade Católica.
- Aldé, A., Escobar, J., & Chagas, V. (2007). A febre dos blogs de política. *Revista Famecos*, 33, 29-40. <https://doi.org/10.15448/1980-3729.2007.33.3431>
- Almeida, A. C. (2008). *A cabeça do eleitor*. Editora FGV.
- Bauer, A. J., Roy, S., & Gago, V. (2025). Hacia un análisis comparativo de la política autoritaria de derechas: Argentina, India y Estados Unidos. *Communication, Culture & Critique*, Advance online publication, tcae054. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ccc/tcae054>
- Bennett, W. L., & Livingston, S. (2020). The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of democratic institutions. *European Journal of Communication*, 35(1), 122-139. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323119886157>

- Bhat, P., & Chadha, K. (2020). Anti-media populism: Expressions of media distrust by right-wing media in India. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication*, 13(2), 166-182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17513057.2020.1739320>
- Bolognesi, B., Ribeiro, E., & Codato, A. (2023). Uma nova classificação ideológica dos partidos políticos brasileiros. *Dados*, 66(2), e20210164. <https://doi.org/10.1590/dados.2023.66.2.303>
- Borba, F. (2015). Propaganda negativa nas eleições presidenciais brasileiras. *Opinião Pública*, 21(2), 268-295. <https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-01912015212268>
- Bos, L., van der Brug, W., & de Vreese, C. (2011). Como a mídia molda as percepções dos líderes populistas de direita. *Comunicação Política*, 28(2), 182-206. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2011.564605>
- Buyens, W., Van Aelst, P., & Paulussen, S. (2024). Curating the news: Analyzing politicians' news sharing behavior on social media in three countries. *Information, Communication & Society*, 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2024.2317901>
- Camara, O., Castro, L., & Oliveira, S. (2022). Quão diferente é o sistema político brasileiro? Um estudo comparativo. E-Legis. *Revista Eletrônica do Programa de Pós-Graduação da Câmara dos Deputados*, 15(37), 7-37. <https://doi.org/10.51206/elegis.v15i37.741>
- Carratalá, A., & Palau-Sampio, D. (2022). Vox and journalistic information. *Observatorio (OBS)*, 16(2), 19-43. <https://doi.org/10.15847/obsOBS16220221898>
- Carreirão, Y. (2014). O sistema partidário brasileiro: um debate com a literatura recente. *Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política*, (14), 255-295. <https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-335220141410>
- Chadwick, A. (2013). *The hybrid media system: Politics and power*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759477.001.0001>
- Comel, N. (2025). “Tá na mídia”, “imprensa militante”, “notícia maravilhosa”: Como parlamentares brasileiros mobilizam a mídia mainstream e alternativa em suas contas no Instagram? [unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Universidade Federal do Paraná.
- Costa, L. R., Lucena, T. F. R., & Rossetto, G. P. N. (2022). Personalização e positividade dos candidatos a prefeito. *Compólitica*, 12(2), 113-142. <https://doi.org/10.21878/compolitica.2022.12.2.589>

- Cushion, S., McDowell-Naylor, D., & Thomas, R. (2021). Why national media systems matter: A longitudinal analysis of how UK left-wing and right-wing alternative media critique mainstream media (2015–2018). *Journalism Studies*, 22(5), 633-652. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2021.1893795>
- Egelhofer, J. L., Aaldering, L., & Lecheler, S. (2021). Delegitimizing the media? Analyzing politicians' media criticism on social media. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 20(5), 653-675. <https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.20081.ege>
- Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology. *Information, Communication & Society*, 20(8), 1109-1126. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697>
- Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (2014). *Mediatization of politics: Understanding the transformation of Western democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ferraz, F. (2008). *Manual completo de campanha eleitoral* (3rd ed.). L&PM Editores.
- Figenschou, T. U., & Ihlebæk, K. A. (2019). Challenging journalistic authority. *Journalism Studies*, 20(9), 1221-1237. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2018.1500868>
- Figueiredo, A., & Limongi, F. (2016). Political institutions and governmental performance in Brazilian democracy. In D. de la Fontaine & T. Stehnen (Eds.), *The political system of Brazil* (pp. 109-130). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_5
- García-Beaudoux, V., Berrocal-Gonzalo, S., & D'Adamo, O. (2020). Atributos de liderazgo en Instagram durante las elecciones presidenciales en Argentina 2019. *index.Comunicación*, 10(1), 173-194. <https://doi.org/10.33732/ixc/10/01Atribu>
- Guerrero, M. (2014). The 'Captured Liberal' model of media systems in Latin America. In M. Guerrero & E. Márquez-Ramírez (Eds.), *Media systems and communication policies in Latin America*. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137409058_3
- Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). *Comparing media systems: Three models of media and politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Haßler, J., Wurst, A. K., & Pohl, K. (2024). Politicians over issues? Visual personalization in three Instagram election campaigns. *Inform-*

- tion, *Communication & Society*, 27(5), 815-835. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2023.2227684>
- Haller, A., & Holt, K. (2019). Paradoxical populism: How PEGIDA relates to mainstream and alternative media. *Information, Communication & Society*, 22(12), 1665-1680. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2018.1449882>
- Holt, K., & Haller, A. (2017). What does 'Lügenpresse' mean? Expressions of media distrust on PEGIDA's Facebook pages. *Politik*, 20(4), 42-57. <https://doi.org/10.7146/politik.v20i4.101534>
- Hopmann, D. N., de Vreese, C. H., & Albæk, E. (2011). Incumbency bonus in election news coverage explained. *Journal of Communication*, 61(2), 264-282. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2011.01540.x>
- Iten, M., & Kobayashi, S. (2002). *Eleição, vença a sua!: As boas técnicas do marketing político*. Ateliê Editorial.
- Kaid, L. L., & Holtz-Bacha, C. (Eds.). (2008). *The SAGE handbook of political advertising*. SAGE Publications.
- Kenix, L. J. (2011). *Alternative and mainstream media: The converging spectrum*. Bloomsbury Academic.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology* (2a ed.). SAGE Publications.
- Landerer, N. (2013). Rethinking the logics: A conceptual framework for the mediatization of politics. *Communication Theory*, 23(3), 239-258. <https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12013>
- Larsson, A. O. (2019). News use as amplification: Norwegian national, regional, and hyperpartisan media on Facebook. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 96(3), 721-741. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699019831439>
- Liminga, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2023). Undermining the legitimacy of the news media: How Swedish members of parliament use Twitter to criticise the news media. *Nordicom Review*, 44(2), 279-298. <https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2023-0015>
- Lowndes, V., & Roberts, M. (Eds.). (2013). *Why institutions matter: The new institutionalism in political science*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Magalhães, E., Albuquerque, A., & Santos, M. A. (2020). Brazilian Blogosfera Progressista: Digital vanguards in dark times. *TripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique*, 18(1), 219-235. <https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v18i1.1126>

- Mainwaring, S., Archer, R., Bruneau, T., Coppedge, M., Domingo, C., Erickson, K., Katz, R., Lijphart, A., O'Donnell, G., Shugart, M., & Valenzuela, S. (1991). Politicians, parties, and electoral systems: Brazil in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 24, 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.2307/422200>
- Marques, F. P. J. (2023). Populism and Critical Incidents in Journalism: Has Bolsonaro Disrupted the Mainstream Press in Brazil? *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 29(4), 825-846. <https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612231153110>
- Marques, F. P. J., Mont'Alverne, C., & Mitozo, I. (2021). Editorial journalism and political interests: Comparing the coverage of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment in Brazilian newspapers. *Journalism*, 22(11), 2803-2821. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884919894126>
- Massuchin, M. G., Orso, M., Moura, J. F. D., & Saleh, D. M. (2022). "TRASH!", "LEFTIST!", "SCUMBAG!", "#FAKENews", but not so much: Attacks and criticism towards media institutions and strategic use of journalism by online far-right activism in Brazil. *Brazilian Journalism Research*, 18(3), 492-523. <https://doi.org/10.25200/BJR.v18n3.2022.1533>
- Mauerberg, A., Pereira, C., & Biderman, C. (2015). The evolution of theories about the Brazilian multiparty presidential system. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 7(1), 143-161. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1500700105>
- Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of politics: A challenge for democracy? *Political Communication*, 16(3), 247-261. <https://doi.org/10.1080/105846099198613>
- Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Robertson, C. T., Ross Arguedas, A., & Nielsen, R. K. (2024). *Reuters Institute digital news report 2024*. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.
- Oliveira, S. (2005). *Palanque eletrônico: O Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral e os gêneros do telejornalismo* [Masters' thesis]. Universidade Federal de Pernambuco.
- Paatelainen, L., Kannasto, E., & Isotalus, P. (2022). Functions of hybrid media: How parties and their leaders use traditional media in their social media campaign communication. *Frontiers in Communication*, 6, 817285. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.817285>

- Palau-Sampio, D., & López-García, G. (2022). Communication and crisis in the public space: Dissolution and uncertainty. *Profesional de la Información*, 31(3), e310316. <https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2022.may.16>
- Peacock, C., Hoewe, J., Panek, E., & Willis, G. P. (2021). Hyperpartisan news use: Relationships with partisanship and cognitive and affective involvement. *Mass Communication and Society*, 24(2), 210-232. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2020.1844902>
- Peucker, M., & Fisher, T. J. (2023). Mainstream media use for far-right mobilisation on the alt-tech online platform Gab. *Media, Culture & Society*, 45(2), 354-372. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01634437221111943>
- Pimentel, P. S., & Marques, F. P. J. (2021). De-Westernizing Media Parallelism: How Editorial Interests Unfold During Impeachment Crises. *Journalism Studies*, 22(3), 282-304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2020.186700>
- Porto, M. P., Neves, D. S., & Lima, B. (2020). Crise hegemônica, ascensão da extrema direita e paralelismo político. *Revista Compolitica*, 10(1), 5-33. <https://doi.org/10.21878/compolitica.2020.10.1.367>
- Recuero, R., & Soares, F. B. (2022). #VACHINA: How politicians help to spread disinformation about Covid-19 vaccines. *Journal of Digital Social Research*, 4(1), 73-97. <https://doi.org/10.33621/jdsr.v4i1.112>
- Roberts, J., & Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2020). Breitbart's attacks on mainstream media: Victories, victimhood, and vilification. In M. Boler & E. Davis (Eds.), *Affective politics of digital media: Propaganda by other means* (pp. 170-185). Routledge.
- Salgado, S. (2022). Mass media and political communication. In J. M. Fernandes, P. C. Magalhães & A. Costa Pinto (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Portuguese Politics* (pp. 308-322). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192855404.013.20>
- Santos, N. (2023). Network information pro and contra Bolsonaro's discourse on coronavirus. *Journal of Digital Social Research*, 5(3), 41-58. <https://doi.org/10.33621/jdsr.v5i3.127>
- Santos, M. A. D., & Albuquerque, A. D. (2024). Classificação ideológica de fontes informacionais: O paralelismo político na análise da

- atenção midiática multipartidária no Brasil. *Opinião Pública*, 30, e3016. <https://doi.org/10.1590/1807-019120243016>
- Strömbäck, J., & Kiouisis, S. (2019). *Political public relations: Principles and applications* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Sued, G. E., & Sáenz-Leandro, R. (2025). Platformization: State of the art and challenges for political communication in Latin America. In A. Casero-Ripollés & P. C. López-López (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Communication in Ibero-America* (pp. 208-219). Routledge.
- Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. (2024). *Confira na página do TSE informações sobre os 29 partidos registrados*. <https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2024/Dezembro/confira-na-pagina-do-tse-informacoes-sobre-os-29-partidos-registrados>
- Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., de Vreese, C., Matthes, J., Hopmann, D., Salgado, S., Hubé, N., Stępińska, A., Papatthanassopoulos, S., Berganza, R., Legnante, G., Reinemann, C., Sheaffer, T., & Stanyer, J. (2017). Political communication in a high-choice media environment: A challenge for democracy? *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 41(1), 3-27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2017.1288551>
- Van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2016). Information and arena: The dual function of the news media for political elites. *Journal of Communication*, 66(3), 496-518. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12229>
- Waisbord, S. (2018). The elective affinity between post-truth communication and populist politics. *Communication Research and Practice*, 4(1), 17-34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/22041451.2018.1428928>
- Waisbord, S., & Amado, A. (2017). Populist communication by digital means: Presidential Twitter in Latin America. *Information, Communication & Society*, 20(9), 1330-1346. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328521>
- Wong, W. L., & Trilling, D. (2023). The interplay between right-wing alternative media, mainstream media, and Republican political elites in the United States. *Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media*, 3, 1-54. <https://doi.org/10.51685/jqd.2023.001>

PROFILES

Michele Goulart Massuchin

Professor of Communication at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), Brazil. Researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and member of the National Institute of Science and Technology on Disputes and Informational Sovereignties (INCT-DSI). She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar) and coordinates the Political Communication and Public Opinion Research Group (CPOP) at UFPR. Her research focuses on political communication, particularly the relationship between media and politics in Ibero-American contexts, media consumption patterns, electoral campaigns, and digital political strategies.

Raquel Mirian Pereira de Souza

Master's student in Political Science at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), supported by a scholarship from the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES). She is a member of the Political Communication and Public Opinion Research Group (CPOP), the Observatory on Online Conflicts, and the National Institute of Science and Technology – Democratic Representation and Legitimacy (ReDem). Her research focuses on political communication and public opinion, with an emphasis on Latin American politics and social elites.

Máira Orso

PhD student in Communication at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), supported by a CAPES scholarship. She is a member of the Political Communication and Public Opinion Research Group (CPOP) and conducts part of her doctoral research at the Autonomous University of Lisbon (Portugal). Her research focuses on political communication, digital far-right movements, electoral campaigns, and digital political strategies.

Daniel Kei Namise

PhD student in Communication at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), supported by a CAPES scholarship. He is a member of the Political Communication and Public Opinion Research Group (CPOP) and the Observatory on Online Conflicts. His research focuses on political communication and public opinion, with a particular emphasis on electoral campaigns and political communication.

Renata Copatti Salvador

Undergraduate student in Public Relations at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR), Brazil. She holds a Scientific Initiation scholarship (a Brazilian research program for undergraduate students) in the field of Communication and Politics. She is a member of the Political Communication and Public Opinion Research Group (CPOP) and currently works as a communications assistant at the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU).